Religiosity in patients with Parkinson’s disease by McNamara, Patrick et al.
Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(3) 341–348
© 2006 Dove Medical Press Limited. All rights reserved
341
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Objective: To study clinical correlates of religiosity in Parkinson’s disease (PD).
Methods:  Measures of life goals, religiosity, mood, and neuropsychologic function were
assessed in 22 persons with mid-stage PD and 20 age-matched healthy controls. Levodopa
dose equivalents (LDE) were also computed for the patients.
Results: Relative to other major life goals parkinsonian patients were significantly more
likely to report that “my religion or life philosophy” was less important than were age-matched
controls. Scores on a battery of religiosity scales were consistently lower for Parkinson’s
patients than those of age-matched controls. While Mini Mental State Exam, logical memory
recall, Stroop, and selected (depression and anxiety) mood scales reliably distinguished patients
from controls, only measures of prefrontal function correlated with religiosity scores.
Conclusions: Patients with PD express less interest in religion and report consistently lower
scores on measures of religiosity than age-matched controls. Prefrontal dopaminergic networks
may support motivational aspects of religiosity.
Keywords: religiosity, Parkinson’s disease, neuropsychology, mood, executive functions,
dopamine agonists
Introduction
Religiousness or life philosophy can be a potent factor in people’s mental and
behavioral make-up, influencing every level of personality from daily habits/practices
to long-term strategies and goals (Batson et al 1993; Emmons and Paloutzian 2003),
yet it has only recently received significant experimental attention from the cognitive
neuroscience community. Several recent carefully controlled neuroimaging (Newberg
et al 1997, 2001; Azari et al 2001) and neuropsychological (Ramachandran et al
1997; McNamara 2001; McNamara et al 2003) investigations of potential brain
correlates of religiosity consistently implicate neo-striatal, limbic, and prefrontal
cortical networks as key nodes in the widely distributed neural networks that
apparently support common religious practices such as prayer and meditation.
If the neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies of religiousness have indeed
uncovered reliable brain correlates of religiosity, then religiosity should vary
significantly in clinical populations that exhibit significant alterations in neo-striatal
and limbic-prefrontal brain functions. Although no direct test of this hypothesis has
yet been conducted, circumstantial evidence is consistent with the prediction.
Religiosity-related symptomology is relatively common in disorders that are
associated with neo-striatal and limbic-prefrontal alterations such as schizophrenia
(Siddle et al 2002), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Tek and Ulug 2001), and certain
forms of temporal lobe epilepsy (Dewhurst and Beard 1970; Geschwind 1983). To
our knowledge, however, there are no published reports of similar religiosity-related
symptomology in Parkinson’s disease (PD) – another prominent disorder of neo-
striatal and prefrontal dysfunction (Agid et al 1987; Starkstein and Merello 2002).
We therefore sought to conduct a pilot investigation into PD patients’ religious
attitudes and practices as well as whether these attitudes and practices correlate with
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key clinical aspects of PD such as age, medication regimes,
mood, and cognitive function.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-two male patients with PD were recruited from the
outpatient Movement Disorders Clinic at the VA Boston
Healthcare System, Boston, MA. Patients were individually
diagnosed by Dr Raymon Durso, director of the clinic, and
all met standard criteria for idiopathic PD. Twelve of the
patients were at Hoehn-Yahr stage II, and 10 at stage III
(Hoehn and Yahr 2001). None of the patients were demented
according to clinical examinations and DSM-III criteria. All
were on some form of dopaminergic medication and were
tested while on medications. Patients with a history of
substance abuse or head injury were excluded. Twenty
healthy control subjects (5 of whom were female) were
recruited from the community and were matched in age to
the group of PD patients.
While the two groups did not differ significantly in terms
of age (PD mean 72.1 (6.9), range 54–82; controls mean
70.5 (6.0), range 55–79, p=0.19), the controls reported
higher levels of education (PD mean 13 years; controls mean
16 years, p=0.002). Mean Mini Mental State Exam (MMSE)
Score was 27.6 (1.4) for PD patients and 29.2 (0.8) for
healthy controls (p<0.003). Demographic characteristics of
the two groups are summarized in Table 1.
A wide range of religious preferences were represented
by patients and controls who participated in these pilot
studies (see Table 2). While Roman Catholics made up the
bulk of the parkinsonian sample (45%), several other faiths
were represented in both the PD and control samples.
Measures
Medication effects
To assess effects of medication type and dose on cognitive
and affective functions we compared different medications
directly at dosages of equivalent efficacy. We followed
Razmy et al (2004) who used a formula to convert
medication dosages to levodopa dosage equivalents (LDE).
The only relevant medications taken by patients in our
sample were carbidopa–levodopa and pramipexole.
Consequently our formula was a simplified version of
Razmy’s, namely:
LDE=67 * (pramipexole dose) + (regular levodopa dose).
Measures of religiosity and life goals
We used the Brief Multidimensional Measure of
Religiousness/Spirituality (BMMRS; Fetzer Institute 1999)
to measure religious attitudes and practices. The BMMRS
Table 1 Demographic and neuropsychological variables on Parkinson’s disease (PD) subjects and controls
PD-N PD-mean  Control-N Control-mean P  value (Bonferroni
(SD) (SD) corrected)
Age 22 72 .1(6.9) 20 70.5 (6.0) 0.19
Education 22 13 (3.1) 17 16 (1.8) 0.002*
MMSE 17 27.6 (1.4) 20 29.2 (0.8) 0.003
Logical memory recall 22 9.2 (2.8) 20 12.7 (3.5) 0.001*
Tower of London (TAS) 20 14.9 (4.8) 20 16.9 (4.4) 0.19
Ravens (B) total 20 26.7 (9.2) 18 21.9 (7.7) 0.09
Stroop interference–switching 19 107.4 (56.4) 20 72 (22.4) 0.016*
DASS total 21 15.3 (8.1) 18 8.7 (7.9) 0.01*
DASS anxiety 21 5.1 (2.9) 18 1.8 (3.2) 0.003*
DASS depression 21 4.8 (3.8) 18 2.1 (2.6) 0.01*
DASS stress 21 5.6 (3.6) 18 4.8 (3.4) 0.47
LDE 22 570 (81) - - -
*p<0.01
Abbreviations: DASS, Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale; LDE, levodopa dose equivalents; MMSE, Mini Mental State Exam, TAS, total achievement score.
Table 2 Religious preferences of participants
Parkinson’s Control Totals
disease 
none 3 1 4
agnostic 0 1 1
atheist 1 0 1
Catholic 10 3 13
Greek orthodox 0 2 2
Jewish 4 3 7
Protestant 0 3 3
Unitarian 1 0 1
Baptist 1 1 2
Episcopalian 1 1 2
Methodist 1 1 2
unknown 0 4 4
Totals 22 20 42Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(3) 343
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contains 38 statements with Likert scale formats that cover
11 religious domains. These are: daily spiritual experiences,
values–beliefs, forgiveness, private religious practices,
religious and spiritual coping, religious support, religious–
spiritual history, commitment, organizational religiousness,
religious preference, and overall self-ranking (eg, “To what
extent do you consider yourself a religious person?”). The
BMMRS was developed by a panel of experts on religion
and health convened by the Fetzer Institute and the National
Institutes of Health and Aging. It has excellent psychometric
properties as well as publicly available norms for healthy
older individuals. Higher scores indicate less religiosity on
these scales.
We used the Rivermead Life Goals inventory (Nair and
Wade 2003) to measure participant’s subjective estimations
of their major life goals. These included 9 areas of personal
concern ranging from residential domestic arrangements and
ability to personally care for oneself, to financial status and
work-related goals. Participants were asked to rate each life
goal domain in importance from 0 (no importance) to 3
(extreme importance). After subjects rated the importance
of these life goals we then asked them to go back and rate
each domain as to whether they felt it was on track or off
track (0 = totally off track to 3 = totally on track). We used
the question “My religion or life philosophy is…”, to assess
the subjective importance of religion to PD patients.
Neuropsychological measures
Our cognitive test battery was chosen with an emphasis on
examining prefrontal neuropsychological function. These
tests have previously been shown to be altered in patients
with PD (Taylor and Saint-Cyr 1995).
The Stroop color-word interference procedure (Stroop
1935) requires the subject to name the color of the ink or to
name the word of a color-word that is printed. The task
involves four test cards: the first containing rows of colored
rectangles with the task being to name the colors as quickly
as possible, the second containing rows of color words
(printed in black ink) with the task being to read the words
as quickly as possible, and the third “interference” test
consisting of rows of color words printed in ink colors
incongruent with the word represented, with the task being
to name the ink colors as quickly as possible. The fourth
card is the “switching card” where subjects are prompted to
either name the color of the ink or to read the word
depending on whether the item is in a box or not. For both
the interference card and some of the switching cards the
subject must ignore the word and name the color. In this
paper we focus on the score derived from the fourth or
“switching” task. Susceptibility to cognitive interference is
calculated as the total time taken to name the colors and
read the words. PET studies show that frontal cortex is
activated in normals during the Stroop task (Bench et al
1993; Vendrell et al 1995).
In the Tower of London (TOL) task (Shallice 1982),
disks have to be moved from a starting configuration on
three sticks of equal length to a target arrangement, which
is presented as a colored drawing. The starting position of
the disks is varied, and in each trial there is a minimum
number of moves in which the solution can be reached. The
subject’s task is to solve the problem as quickly as possible
in as few moves as possible. We tabulated the total
achievement score (TAS) for this task, which takes into
account whether the subject completed each trial within
a given time and how many errors were made. A SPECT
study has demonstrated left prefrontal cortex activation
in subjects attempting to plan their moves (Morris et al
1993).
We administered a logical memory test adapted from
the version presented in the Wechsler Memory Scales –
Revised (WMS-R; Wechsler 1987). Briefly, participants are
read a story and then asked immediately, and again after a
delay of 20 minutes, to recall the story. They are given points
for each of the major elements of the story they recall. The
greater the number of points received the better the recall.
Episodic recall of stories and other verbal material is thought
to be mediated by widely distributed diencephalic structures
deep to the temporal lobes (Lezak 1995).
The Ravens Colored Progressive Matrices (RCPM Series
B; Raven 1965) consists of a series of abstract, complex,
non-representational visual designs that progress in design
complexity as the test progresses. Subjects are presented
with an array of designs from which they must select a target
design that will visually complete a problem target design.
The RCPM is a test of general intelligence as it requires the
subject to conceptualize complex spatial and numerical
relationships in order to successfully select the correct match
from the array of false lures. Lezak (1995) reviews the
evidence for sensitivity of RCPM to posterior cortical
lesions.
Mood tests
We assessed depression, stress and anxiety with the
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS) developed
by Lovibond and Lovibond (1995). Crawford and Henry
(2003) and Antony et al (1998) have demonstrated excellentNeuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(3) 344
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reliability, validity, and other psychometric properties for
the three subscales of the DASS. The test includes 21
questions, 7 in each of the depression, anxiety, and stress
subscales. For each of the items on the DASS the patient
was asked to “Please read each statement and circle a number
0, 1, 2 or 3 that indicates how much the statement applied
to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong
answers. Do not spend too much time on any statement.”
The response scale is presented as: 0 = Did not apply to me
at all, 1 = Applied to me to some degree or some of the time,
2 = Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part
of the time, 3 = Applied to me very much, or most of the
time. Included on the depression subscale are items such
as, “I felt I had nothing to look forward to” and “I felt I
wasn’t worth much as a person”. On the anxiety subscale
were such items as “I felt scared without any good reason”
and “I was worried about situations in which I might panic
and make a fool of myself”. The stress subscale included
items such as: “I found it difficult to relax” and “I felt that I
was rather touchy”.
Results
PD vs control differences on Rivermead
Life Goals Scale
The comparisons between PD and controls may be seen in
Table 3. Both controls and PD patients reported that their
residential domestic arrangements, personal care, work,
relationship with primary partner, family life, contact with
friends, and financial affairs were “on track” and important
to them. PD patients, however, rated their leisure activities–
hobbies and their religion as less important than their age-
matched counterparts, despite rating these same activities
as being “on track”.
PD vs control differences on religiosity
scales
Scores on religiosity scales can be seen in Table 4. PD
patients were significantly less religious than controls
(overall index mean PD=7.1 (0.9); controls=5.3 (1.4);
p<0.04, higher scores indicate less religiosity). It can be
Table 3 Parkinson’s disease (PD) vs control means on the Rivermead Life Goals Scale
PD patients Controls
“importance” “on track” “importance” “on track”
My residential and domestic arrangements  2.5 (0.7) 2.5 (0.6) 2.4 (0.7) 2.6 (0.5)
My ability to manage my personal care 2.4 (0.6) 2.3 (0.8) 2.7 (0.5) 3.0 (0)
(dressing, toilet, washing)
My leisure, hobbies and interests including pets  1.5 (0.8)* 2.4 (0.6) 2.0 (0.8) 2.5 (0.6)
My work, unpaid or paid is 2.0 (0.9) 1.9 (0.8) 2.1 (0.7) 2.5 (0.5)
My relationship with my partner 2.3 (0.9) 2.1 (1.0) 2.4 (0.7) 2.3 (0.9)
(or my wish to have one) is
My family life (including those not living at 2.4 (0.8) 2.1 (0.6) 2.5 (0.7) 2.6 (0.7)
my home) is
My contacts with friends, neighbors and 2.0 (0.7) 2.1 (0.7) 2.2 (0.8) 2.5 (0.5)
acquaintances are
My religion or life philosophy is 1.3 (0.9)* 2.0 (0.7) 2.2 (0.9) 2.5 (0.6)
My financial status is 2.0 (0.8) 2.0 (0.7) 2.2 (0.7) 2.5 (0.6)
Key: 0 = of no importance; 3 = of extreme importance; 0 = totally off track; 3 = totally on track.
Table 4 Measures of religiosity (lower scores = higher
religiosity)
Parkinson’s Control P value 
disease 
Daily spirituality 26.8 (6.9) 23.7 (7.1) 0.20
Values index 4.8 (1.6) 4.3 (1.7) 0.34
Forgiveness 7.5  (2.2) 6.4 (2.5) 0.18
Private practices  33.3 (7.2)  26.3 (7.9) 0.050*
Coping  25.4 (6.0) 22.7 (4.1) 0.13
Support  13.6 (2.5) 12.7 (2.7) 0.32
Organized religiosity 9.3 (2.7) 8.4 (3.0) 0.37
Overall religiosity 7.1 (.9) 5.3 (1.4) 0.04*
* p values are Bonferroni corrected.
NOTES: Daily spirituality: index of “daily spiritual experience” items, sum of
Fetzer items 1–6 (Fetzer Institute 1999). Possible range is 6–36. Lower score
indicates higher religiousness; Values index: index of “values–beliefs” items, sum
of Fetzer items 7 and 8. Possible range is 2–8, and lower scores indicated higher
religiousness; Forgiveness: index of “forgiveness” items, sum of Fetzer items 9–
11. Possible range is 3–12. Lower score indicates higher religiousness; Private
practices: index of “private religious practices”, sum of Fetzer items 12–16.
Possible range is 5–40. Lower score indicates higher religiousness; Coping: index
of “religious and spiritual coping”, sum of Fetzer 17–23. Possible range is 7–28.
Lower score indicates higher reliance on religion for coping strategies; Support:
index of “religious support”, sum of Fetzer 24–27. Possible range is 4–16. Lower
score indicates more involvement with congregation; Organized religiosity: index
of “organized religious activities”, sum of Fetzer items 34 and 35. Possible range
is 2–12. Lower score indicates higher religiousness; Overall religiosity: sum of
Fetzer “overall self-ranking” items 37 and 38. Possible range is 2–8. Lower score
indicates higher overall religiousness.Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(3) 345
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seen that although PD patients reported less religiosity on
every scale compared with age-matched controls, the
difference was significant only for the overall index and for
the scale on private practices (ie, prayer and meditation,
private devotional reading; PD mean=33.3 (7.2); controls
26.3 (7.9), p=0.050).
PD vs control differences on
neuropsychological and mood function.
The two groups differed significantly on MMSE, logical
memory recall, and Stroop interference–switching score
(Table 1). They did not differ significantly on the Tower of
London total achievement score (PD 14.9 (4.8); controls,
16.9 (4.4); p=0.19) and the Ravens Progressive Matrices
Task (PD 26.7(9.2); controls 21.9(7.7), p=0.09). With
respect to mood function, the two groups differed
significantly on total score on the Depression Anxiety Stress
Scale (p=0.01), the DASS anxiety (p=0.003), and depression
(p=0.01) sub-scales.
Correlates of overall religiousness in
PD patients vs controls
We next performed a series of correlational analyses using
the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. We
correlated the BMMRS overall index of religiosity with
demographic, mood, and neuropsychologic variables in
order to further explore determinants of religiosity in PD.
Correlations are displayed in Table 5. Within the PD group,
overall religiousness correlated with the Stroop interference–
switching score (indicating the greater the frontal
dysfunction the less the religiosity). Overall religiousness
correlated negatively with the Ravens score, indicating that
the better the performance on the Raven visual intelligence
test the more the religiousness. Within the healthy control
group religiosity was correlated with a measure of stress
and inversely correlated with logical memory recall scores.
Reasoning that severity of PD might be correlated with
indices of religiosity we next ran Spearman correlations
(data not shown) between all of the major religiosity indexes
from the BMMRS scale and Hoehn-Yahr stage. All of these
correlations except for the Coping Index were below r=0.24
and none but the Coping Index were significant. Spearman’s
r for the association between H-Y stage and the Coping
Index, however, was significant and equal 0.48 (p=0.01)
indicating (paradoxically perhaps) that the more severe or
advanced the PD disorder the less likely patients used
religion to cope.
Discussion
We found that patients with PD reported significantly lower
levels of religiousness than did age-matched controls, and
that this low level of religiosity was related primarily to a
measure of prefrontal neuropsychological function rather
than to age, education, mood, or to medication-related
factors. Since we had a rather homogenous PD group (all
mid-stage patients) we could not directly test an association
between severity of disease and religiosity. On the other
hand, a rank-order Spearman correlational analysis between
Hoehn-Yahr stage scores and the religiosity scales revealed
that the more severely affected patients were less likely to
use religion as a coping method. To our knowledge, this is
the first study to quantitatively explore neuropsychological
and neuropsychiatric correlates of religiosity in PD patients.
Why should PD patients report less religiousness than
age-matched healthy controls? We found that the PD patients
were more depressed than age-matched controls, but
religiousness scores were not significantly related to
depression scores. One argument that has been presented is
that religiousness may be inversely related to intelligence
or education levels, in that people with higher intelligence
or more education would be less likely to be religious. Our
sample of PD patients performed marginally better than
Table 5 Pearson product moment correlations between the
BMMRS Overall Index religiosity scale and demographic, mood,
and neuropsychological measures
Parkinson’s Controls
disease
Age 0.09 –0.17
Education –0.17 –0.11
MMSE –0.14 –0.22
Logical memory recall 0.07 0.59*
Ravens (B) –0.48* 0.33
Tower of London (TAS) –0.12 0.23
LDE –0.16 _
Stroop interference/switching 0.48* –0.21
DASS Anxiety –0.12 –0.35
DASS Depression 0.37 –0.21
DASS Stress 0.09 –0.43*
* p<0.01, Bonferronni corrected.
NOTES: Logical memory recall: number of elements of story remembered at 20
minutes; Stroop interference–switching time: total time (secs) taken to read
through the switching card of the Stroop test; Tower of London TAS; composite
score reflecting how many towers were completed correctly within allotted
time, and how many moves tower was completed in; Ravens: total score on the
B series where a subject needs to match an abstract visual design in one panel
with a series of similar abstract designs in a separate panel. There is only one
correct match; DASS Anxiety, DASS Depression, DASS Stress: sum of scores on
anxiety–depression subscale from the DASS.
Abbreviations: BMMRS, Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness–
Spirituality; DASS, Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale; LDE, levodopa dose
equivalents; MMSE, Mini Mental State Exam, TAS, total achievement score.Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(3) 346
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controls on a measure of visual intelligence (Ravens) and
this measure was in turn significantly and inversely
correlated with religiousness scores in PD patients but not
controls. The latter finding suggests that in our sample, the
higher the visual intelligence the greater the religousness,
indicating a possible positive relationship between
intelligence and religiosity in this sample of Parkinson’s
patients.
We did not find a significant correlation between the
overall religiousness index and years of education in either
the patients or the controls. The relationship between
educational level and religiosity in healthy samples is, in
any case, complex: high educational levels generally are
positively correlated with frequent church attendance but
negatively correlated with the occurrence of mystical or
religious experiences (Batson et al 1993, p 40). The
correlation of religiosity with Stroop interference–switching
scores (a measure of cognitive inhibitory capacity and
perhaps frontal lobe integrity), furthermore, argues
against the “too intelligent” explanation for the lack of
religiosity in PD patients. It therefore appears that
intelligence level is not a likely explanation of religiosity
in these PD patients.
An alternative explanation for our major finding starts
with this same correlation between frontal dysfunction and
decreased religiousness scores in PD patients. It may be
that long-term forms of religiosity require participation of
the motivational support normally supplied by the
dopaminergic drive centers housed in neo-striatal and
limbic-prefrontal circuits. The previously cited
neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies linking
religious practices with prefrontal network activation is
consistent with this hypothesis. Recent reports (Comings et
al 2000; Hamer 2004) linking scores on religiosity and
measures of “self-transcendence” with genetic markers for
the dopamine transport molecule and the DRD4 gene coding
for a dopaminergic receptor (which is densely represented
in prefrontal cortex) supports this hypothesis as well. PD
patients experience relatively global reduction in central and
forebrain dopamine activity as the disease progresses. If
dopaminergic activity supports key aspects of religiosity
then it would not be surprising to find PD patients lacking
in overt signs of religiosity. Our finding of a correlation
between severity of disease (H-Y stage score) and the
Coping Index with more severely affected patients less likely
to use religion as a coping device is consistent with the idea
that prefrontal dopamine is crucial for long term support of
religiosity.
Religiosity has traditionally been linked to the temporal
lobes (Geschwind 1983). But most of the evidence for a
role of the temporal lobes in religious experience was based
on observations of the behaviors of a small subset of
temporal lobe epileptics who exhibited the interictal
behavioral syndrome (Dewhurst and Beard 1970). The
syndrome included hyper-religiosity as one of its signs.
d’Aquili and Newberg (1999), however, very sensibly
suggest that all the major association areas of the cortex
generate some aspect of the total religious experience. In
their models of religiosity the temporal lobes attach meaning
and significance to events while posterior parietal sites
participate in construction of both the sense of self and the
accompanying sense of the dissolution of the self during
mystical states. With respect to the frontal lobes, d’Aquili
and Newberg (1999) reviewed a number of studies that
apparently established a link between sustained attention
associated with the practice of meditation and EEG theta
waves above the prefrontal cortex. The EEG data therefore
suggests that sustained meditation results in activation of
prefrontal networks. Newberg et al (1997, 2001) later
confirmed these EEG data using SPECT imaging
techniques. Regional cerebral blood flow changes were
studied in six highly experienced meditators while they
meditated. Results demonstrated significantly increased
blood flow to the inferior frontal and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortical regions while subjects engaged in “intense
meditation”. More recently and using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques, Azari and Nickel
(2001) reported greater dorsolateral frontal, dorsomedial
frontal and medial parietal cortex activation during religious
recitation in self-described religious subjects. McNamara
et al (2003) reported significant correlations between
frequency of prayer and performance on a battery of
prefrontal tasks in a large sample of community dwelling
elderly. Taken together, the data summarized in this report
and the available evidence reviewed indicate that the neural
substrates of sustained religiosity likely include mesocortical
dopaminergic systems that likely support motivational and
goal oriented behavioral systems.
This was a pilot study with a relatively small patient
number and thus our conclusions should be treated with
caution. We also did not record the side of onset of disease
in this convenience sample of patients. In most patients with
PD, damage to the basal ganglia is asymmetric in that there
is more extensive damage on either the right or the left side
of the brain, and thus the dopaminergic corticostriatal
circuits would be differentially affected. This inference isNeuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2006:2(3) 347
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supported by several SPECT studies that have shown greater
dopamine depletion in the hemisphere contralateral to the
side of motor symptom onset (Antonini et al 1995; Booij et
al 1997; Tissingh et al 1998; Mozley et al 2000), by studies
demonstrating that asymmetrical dopamine depletion
persists after motor symptoms appear bilaterally (Leenders
et al 1990; Antonini et al 1995), and by post-mortem studies
that found significant neuronal loss in the hemisphere
contralateral to the side of the body on which motor
symptoms first appeared (Kempster et al 1989). One
wonders, therefore, if neuropsychological functions might
also be differentially affected by side of symptom onset.
Thus, with left striatal damage, verbal mediation of cognitive
tasks might be more difficult, and with right striatal damage,
mood and perhaps religiosity might be more affected. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for this intriguing suggestion.
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